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THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON THE LIABILITY OF
AN INSURER WHERE THE INSURED HAS BEEN
EXECUTED FOR THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME
MOSE E. BOIARsKYC
Despite variant pronouncements by courts as to the propriety
of basing decisions on their interpretation of public policy," that so-
called "unruly horse ' 2 has been a juridical guide in determining
whether the legal execution of an insured for the commission of a
crime is a valid defense in an action on a policy of life insurance,
wherein there is no express condition excepting from the coverage
thereof the risk of death by such cause. Whether the result reached
has been favorable to the insurer or to those whom the insured
designated as recipients of the benefits, public policy has been a
factor in the conclusion or judgment.
I
Probably the earliest case to deal with the question of
whether a recovery could be effected on a life insurance policy
where the insured had been executed for the commission of a crime
is Amicable Society v. Boland,3 frequently referred to as Fauntle-
roy's case. The insured had been convicted of the crime of forgery,
then a capital offense, and was sentenced to be and was hanged.
His assignees in bankruptcy sought to recover on the policy, which
contained no exception to payment upon death at the hanids of
justice, and it was the opinion of the Master of the Rolls4 that
recovery should be had, but upon appeal, the House of Lords
reversed that ruling and held that death at the hands of the law
was not an insurable hazard. Because courts have, and still do,
quote with approbation the language of the Lord Chancellor, it
merits consideration:
Member of the Bar of Charleston, West Virginia.
'Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law (1928) 42 HAxv. L.
Rgv. 76.
2 Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 242-3, 252 (1824).
3 3 Russ. Ch. 351, 4 Bligh N. S. 194, 5 Eng. Rep. R. 70 (1830).
4 "When the policy does not provide that the obligation to pay shall deter-
mine, if the event insured against shall happen in a certain specified manner,
then, if the event do happen in that manner, the obligation to pay shall not
determine merely because the conduct of the party insured produced the event,
even though such conduct was an offense against the criminal law of the
country. To avoid the obligation to pay, the act of the party insured, which
produced the event, must be done fraudulently, for the very purpose of produc-
ing the event."
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" ... Suppose that in the policy itself this risk had been
insured against; that is, that the party insuring had agreed to
pay a sum of money, year by year, upon condition that in the
event of his committing a capital felony, and being tried, con-
victed, and executed for that felony, his assignees shall receive
a certain sum of money; is it possible that such a contract
could be sustained? Is it not void upon the plainest principles
of public policy? Would not such a contract (if available)
take away one of those restraints operating on the minds of
men against the commission of crime, namely, the interest we
have in the welfare and prosperity of our connexions? Can
we, considering the policy, give to it the effect of that insertion,
which, if expressed in terms, would have rendered the policy,
as far as that condition went, at least, altogether void?"
When the question first reached the Supreme Court of the
United States," the doctrine of the Boland case had already received
that court's approval.; The same considerations and reasoning
which supported the Boland case led the court to the conclusion
that voluntary self-destruction-a felony at common law1 -was not
within the risks contemplated by the parties, although an English
decision had previously reached a contrary result and had per-
mitted a recovery in favor of a beneficiary wife where the insured,
while sane, had intentionally killed himself.8 From these cases'
there arose a new postulate of public policy, namely, that there is
an "implied obligation on the part of every insured to do nothing
to accelerate wrongfully the maturity of his policy." Upon such
factors of public policy have other courts since avoided payment.'"
At this point it is to be observed that state courts did not sanc-
tion the doctrine of the Bitter"- case where a beneficiary of a suicide
5 Burt v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362, 23 S. Ct. 139 (1902).
6 Ritter v. Mutual Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139, 18 S. Ct. 300 (1898).
7 1 HAIz, P. C. (1736) c. 27.
8 Moore v. Woolsey, 24 Eng. L. and Eq. R. 248 (1854) wherein there is stated:
"The supposed inducement to commit suicide under such circumstances can-
not vitiate the condition more than the inducement which the lessor may be
supposed to have to commit murder should render invalid a beneficial lease
granted for lives. When we are called upon to nullify a contract on the
ground of public policy, we must take care that we do not lay down a rule
which may interfere with the innocent and useful transactions of mankind."
0 Burt v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 5; Ritter v. Mut. Ins. Co.,
supra n. 6.
10 Collins v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 27 Pa. Sup. Ct. 353 (1905); Northwestern
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234, 32 S. Ct. 220 (1912) ; Scarborough
v. Amer., etc., Co., 171 N. C. 353, 88 S. E. 482 (1916); Amer. Nat. Ins. Co.
v. Munson, 202 S. W. 987 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Smith v. Met. Life Ins.
Co., 211 N. Y. Supp. 755, 125 Misc. Rep. 670 (1925).
1 Supra n. 6.
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sought recovery."2 In Georgia, despite a statute" which released
an insurer from the obligation of contract in the event of suicidal
death, it was held that no public policy was involved which would
preclude the insurer from waiving the benefit of the statute and
expressly contracting to pay in the event of the insured's death
by self-destruction.'4 In Missouri, a statute' excluded suicide as
a defense. The policy, issued after passage of the statute, restricted
the liability of the insurance company to one-tenth of the principal
sum insured in the event of suicide not contemplated by the insured
at the time the application was made. Justice Harlan who deliver-
ed the opinion in the Ritter case again expressed the views of the
Supreme Court of the United States' 6 and adjudged that, under
the statute, the beneficiary could recover the full sum.'
7
The Illinois court was the first to repudiate the reasoning of the
Boland case when the question of the effect of the insured's death
by execution for crime on recovery of an insurance policy was pre-
sented to it. It found the public policy enunciated in the Boland
case to havw been influenced by the law of forfeitures existent in
England at the time the Lord Chancellor rendered his decision.'s
To the Illinois court, the right of the insured's personal repre-
sentative to the proceeds of the policy was one of property. The
policy of insurance, it found, was a chose in action, which should
devolve as did all real property and any other personal property,
according to the rules pertaining to the descent and distribution
of property. In constitutional and statutory provisions which pro-
vided that no conviction should work a forfeiture of estate, the
court discovered a manifestation of the public policy of that juris-
diction.
Prior to the Illinois decision, courts had dealt with the ques-
2 Lange v. Royal Highlanders, 75 Neb. 188, 110 N. W. 1110 (1907); Pat-
terson v. Nat. P. Life Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 118, 75 N. W. 980 (1898); see Smith
v. Met. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 10, which holds that beneficiary's right must
be vested.
13 Ga. Ann. Code, 1926, § 2500.
'4 Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Durden, 9 Ga. App. 792, 72 S. E. 295 (1911).
1 Mo. REv. ST. (1919) § 6945.
16 Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U. S. 489, 27 S. Ct. 578 (1906).
17 Statutes with respect to suicide as a defense to actions on insurance
policies have generally been regarded as valid. Among statutes which preclude
suicide as a defense are: VA. CODE ANN. (1930) § 4228; Mo. REV. STAT.
(1919) § 6150; COLO. COmP. LAWS, ANN. (1921) § 2532; ComP. TEx.
STAT. (1928) art. 4733.
18 Collins v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542 (1907). Forfeitures
for crime were abolished in England by 33 and 34 Vict. c. 23, (1870).
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tion solely from a contractual standpoint, out the Illinois court
stated;
"f a man who is executed for a crime has at his death
$1,000.00 in real estate, $1,000.00 in chattels, and $1,000.00
life insurance payable to his estate, his real estate descends to
his heir, and his personal chattels to his administrator, but the
$1,000.00 life insurance must be left in the hands of the com-
pany who received the premiums because it is said to be con-
trary to public policy to require the company to pay, lest by
so doing it lend encouragement to other policyholders to seek
murder, and execution therefor, in order that their estates or
heirs might profit thereby. This is defendant in error's posi-
tion. This contention seems to border closely upon the
absurd."
This theory that the policy is a species of property, to be gov-
erned by the rules of public policy relating to the devolution of
property, has been both disapproved 9 and sanctioned 2 by other
courts. In a critique of the doctrine"' the conclusion reached was
that regardless of whether the plaintiff who sought recovery was
the personal representative of the insured or a nominated bene-
ficiary whose rights in the policy were or were not vested, the
right of such person was based upon contract and the validity of
such right must, therefore, be determined by rules of public policy
governing contracts and not rules of public policy governing the
descent of property, on the theory that during the lifetime of the
insured the contract was executory, that there was no present right
to the proceeds of the policy until the contract became fully exe-
cuted by the happening of the contingency upon which it was
based, and only then if all conditions had been fulfilled. In the
latest case dealing with the question, the West Virginia court "2
made no comment on the theory of the Illinois court; but in a
constitutional provision, similar to that of Illinois which prohibited
the forfeiture of estates as a result of felony, and in the statutes
of descent and distribution, the court found elements of a public
19 Searborough v. Ins. Co., supra n. 10, disposes of the fllinois case in this
manner: "It is not necessary that we should discuss that case, except to say
that we do not regard it as a precedent to be followed."
20 Fields v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 147 Tenn. 464, 249 S. W. 798 (1923) ; Weeks
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 128 S. C. 223, 122 S. E. 591 (1924).
21 Summers, Tegal Execution as a Defense to an Action on a Life Insurance
Policy (1919) 7 KY. L. J. 1.
22 Corey v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 178 S. E. 525 (W. Va. 1935), wherein
the court pointed out that in West Virginia public policy was reflected by
judicial decisions to the effect that civil death as a consequence of a felony no
longer obtained.
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policy which was "to do away with the consequences of crime,
except in so far as the direct punishment to the guilty person is
concerned."
IT
With courts thus attempting to evade the postulates of the
public policy announced in the earlier cases, it is not surprising to
find the incontestable clause urged to preclude the defense that the
insured had met his death at the hands of justice.23 It was argued,
however, and with success, that in such case, the insurance com-
pany does not contest its liability under the policy but simply
asserts that death so caused was not a risk which it assumed. It
distinguishes between non-coverage and a breach of some condition
subsequent." To the South Carolina court, however, "the real
question, therefore, in this aspect of the subject, is whether it is
against sound public policy for the insurer to assume this par-
ticular risk of being defrauded," and it could "see no reason why
it may not lawfully contract to assume the risk or waive the defense
of the insured's fraud in wrongfully maturing the contract."2
As support for the conclusion of the Ritter ease, the court
cited Supreme Commandery v. Ainsworth2 which had, in turn,
approved the Boland case, but which did not involve an incontest-
able clause. There is factual pertinency therein, since the Ala-
bama court in a later case,2 7 which involved the usual incontestable
clause, declared it to be a material and valuable portion of the con-
tract and that thereby the company waived its defense of suicide.
The effect of the clause was expressed thus:
"It was not an agreement to pay him, his estate, or the
beneficiary that amount if he committed suicide or was exe-
cuted by virtue of the criminal law, or in any other manner
contributed to his own death. The company merely agreed
23 There is no mention of an incontestable clause in any of the following
cases: Amicable Soc. v. Boland, supra n. 3; Burt v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
aupra n. 5; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCue and Smith v. Met. Life
Ins. Co., supra n. 10.
-4 Scarborough v. Ins. Co.; Collins v. Met. Life Ins. Co., both suptra n. 10.
The theory of non-coverage is that when public policy speaks, it does so from
the beginning.
- Weeks v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 20. See the decision of Hender-
son v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 179 S. E. 680 (1935), Where the South Carolina
court declared that the incontestable clause did not preclude the defense
that the beneficiary had no insurable interest.
2 71 Ala. 436 (1882).
-7Mutual Life Ins. Co. Y. Lovejoy, 201 Ala. 337, 78 S. E. 299 (1917),
decided by a divided court on rehearing.
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and bound itself that it would not litigate any of these ques-
tions, though without the incontestable clause they would be
a defense. "28
An interesting comparison with the language just quoted is
the view taken by the Supreme Court of the United States, when,
in 1920, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit certi-
fied to the appellate court two cases which presented the question
of insurers' liability in suicide cases.29
In the first of these cases, the policy had been issued on the
life of one Johnson; it was payable to his wife and contained a
provision that "if within two years from the date hereof the said
insured shall .... die by his own hand .... the policy shall be
void." The second case had been brought by the insured's per-
sonal representative on a policy which contained no expression as
to suicide but contained an incontestable clause effective one year
from the date of the policy. Johnson died a suicide, while sane,
after the limitations of time expressed in each of the policies. Of
the incontestable clause, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Holmes, said:
"The object of the clause is plain and laudable-to create
an absolute assurance of the benefit, as free as may be from
any dispute of fact except the fact of death, and as free as it
reasonably can be done."
The suicide clause, it stated, was but "an inverted expression of
the same general intent" as that of the incontestable clause and
"both equally mean that suicide" after the specified time is not
a defense.
The language of the court that the question presented involved
express undertakings rather than implied exceptions has induced
the argument that the court did not, expressly or tacitly, overrule
the Ritter case.30 There is, however, no escape from the facts that
the insured had by his own act matured payment of the policy and
that what the court had expressly held in the Ritter case to be
against public policy became permissive under its later pronounce-
28 See also Murphy v. Metrop. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ga. 393, 110 S. E. 178
(1921); Afro-American Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 113 Fla. 158, 151 So. 405
(1933).
29 Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson and Nat]. Life Ins. Co. of
Montpelier, Vt. v. Miller, Adm'r, 254 U. S. 96, 41 S. Ct. 47 (1920).
so See Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 X. Y. 449, 169 N. E. 642 (1930),
where Cardozo, Ch. J., in commenting on Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, says: "The clause there in question was not a limitation as to cover-
age. It was a provision for a forfeiture." But of. (1932) 6 TuLANE L. REV.
634, criticizing the result in the Conway case.
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ments.3 1 The court had previously given judicial sanction to
states' rights in the matter of establishing their own public policy,32
but it is submitted that had the court been inclined to its former
conclusion, it would have required a showing that the policy of the
state concerned would not be violated by a finding favorable to the
beneficiary or the presonal representative. Nor was the language
that the question presented involved express undertakings amiss,
for the question of implied exception arises only where public
policy is invoked: without it, the only consideration can be that of
an express undertaking.
Another view of the effect of an incontestable clause is pre-
sented by the West Virginia court.3 3 In its opinion public policy
will not yield to the incontestable clause, but "that is not to say
that the incontestable clause, which is an express covenant of the
policy, could not be successfully invoked to overcome the contended
provisions of an implied covenant of the policy."
III
How imperative are the postulates of public policy relied upon
to avoid a contract, valid from its inception to the very moment
the state exacts the life of the insured as a punishment? Does
sound public policy require that legal execution as an excepted
risk be written into a contract by judicial decision where the con-
tracting parties have omitted it?
One argument used for reading into the policy of the implied
obligation on the insured's part "to do nothing to accelerate
wrongfully the maturity of the policy" is based strongly upon a
supposed analogy to fire insurance. The New Jersey court early
stamped such reasoning as specious,3" citing authority that a con-
tract of life insurance is not one of indemnity.3 The lack of a
determinable method of ascertaining the financial worth of a
human life is not the sole difference between life and fire insurance.
In life insurance the only uncertainties are- the time and manner
31 " The basis for this rule has been cut from under it by the decision of the
Northwestern Life Insurance Company v. Johnson." RicHArms, LAW op IN-
suRANCE (4th ed. 1932) 654. See also Note (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 401, to
the effect that the Ritter case was "tacitly repudiated by that process of
casuel reference which Mr. Justice Holmes used so gracefully."
32 Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra n. 16.
33 Corey v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 22.
34 Campbell v. Sup. Conclave, 66 N. J. L. 274, 49 Atl. 550 (1901).
- IDalby v. India & L. L. Assur. Co., 15 C. B. 365, 139 Eng. Rep. R. 465
(1854).
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of death, while the event of loss by fire may or may not happen 0
Another argument usea to support the existence of an implied
condition is that the insurer does not contemplate incurring the
risk of death by suicide, for, if he knew that the insured would
take his own life the contract would constitute a fraud on the
insurer. Of course, if an insured contracts for life insurance in
contemplation of suicide, recovery on such a policy would be con-
cealment of a fact material to the risk;37 but here the basis of the
fraud appears to be the fact that the insurer did not contemplate
the risk3 11
Reverting to the language in the Boland case, we find that the
public policy therein expressed is based upon two elements: first,
that a contract which induces the commission of crime is void, and
second, that no benefit should flow from such a wrongful act. The
theory that recovery on policies would be an inducement to crime
has been ridiculed. To the Illinois court3 0 it "bordered on the
absurd." The Tennessee court" commented thus:
"It is fanciful to say that the cancellation of an insurance
policy will restrain a man from crime. The law of the land,
the machinery for its enforcement, and the restraints of con-
science do this."
And, in the same tenor the South Carolina court speaks thus :41
"Certainly, to indulge the surmises that a forfeiture of
life insurance would add any element of potency to the inhi-
bition already imposed upon the criminal will by the electric
chair and the hangman's noose, would seem clearly to trench
upon the fanciful and speculative."
The theory of inducement to commit crime is ably attacked by
the charge that it is not the crime of murder that prevents the re-
covery, but it is the punishment that sometimes follows that crime
that does so. In other words, one might be convicted of murder
in the first degree but not executed because of the jury's finding
that he be punished by life imprisonment; or there might be a
conviction of murder, in the first degree, a sentence to be hanged,
36 HUEBNEm, PRINCIPLES or LiFE INSURANCE (1928) 152.
37 Supra n. 21.
38 Compare with the problem under consideration, the situation in Henderson
v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., supra n. 25, where one having no insurable interest in
the life of the insured procures the issuance of a policy on the theory that
such a contract is void as a wager contract against public policy.
39 Supra n. 18.
40 Supra n. 20.
41 Weeks v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 20.
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and a natural death before hanging; or, again, there might be a
conviction of murder in the first degree, a sentence of hanging, and
later a pardon: in either event his life insurance would remain
enforceable.
42
If, as we have just shown that the theory of inducement is a
fallacious one, and if we are to believe that the welfare of society
is the supreme end of law,4 3 why should a court, against innocent
beneficiaries, impose a forfeiture which the contract does not de-
mand? Under modern social and economic conditions, life insur-
ance has become a business which in a very real sense is impressed
with a public interest.4 4  The business of life insurance has under-
gone considerable development since the day of the Boland case,
and even since the Burt case has its importance grown as a factor
in the economic life of our people.45 Against the public good to
be subserved by avoiding recovery, upon the tenuous theory that
such forfeiture would tend to discourage the commission of crime,
the South Carolina court balanced the public welfare which would
be promoted by requiring payment of the insurance.4' The state
is vitally concerned in the protection of creditors, in the prevention
of waste and sacrifice of estates, and in providing for dependent
ones. Frequently, life insurance policies are kept in force through
sacrifices of infants and spouses. "Why should the state consider
the continuance of his life as a thing so valuable, and the welfare
of'his suffering family as a thing to be held so cheap ? 47 Again,
policies of life insurance are frequently employed as a means for
the procurement of loans. If the rights of an assignee for value
are to be destroyed by the insured's commission of crime, the
efficacy of the policy as a medium of credit is impaired.
42 Corey v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 22.
43 CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 66.
44 Weeks v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 19.
45 "Every American insurance agent has an attractive life policy for you
in case you think of dying, an endowment if you still want to live, and an
annuity or disability policy if you are in fear of growing old or crippled.
If you can afford none of these, he has a promising offer on much more
modest 'industrial' terms, of a nice coffin and 'really decent' funeral.
His bag is full of bargains .... You can have them at retail or wholesale
in the new 'package' insurance." Epstein, THE INSURANCE RACKET (Sept.
1930) 21 Am. Mercury 1.
40 Weeks v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 20.
47 George Richards, LIFE INSURANCE - SUICIDE AND EXECUTION FOR CRIME
(1913) 22 Yale L. J. 292, 297.
9
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IV
This surveys the hopeless conflict of authority. The public
policy of the Boland case has been, in some jurisdictions, scruti-
nized and denied; and if, to obtain a socially desirable result, there
has been error in some of the mental processes, the result obtained
is indeed more justifiable than the persistency of a fallacious rule
predicated on naught than the "blind imitation of the past." Else-
where herein is shown the abandonment of the doctrine of the
RBitter case. There is even less justification for adherence to the
doctrine as applied to facts similar to those in the Boland and Burt
cases, for tested by experience, it is not consonant with either a
sense of justice or the social welfare. We may well be grateful to
those jurists who have aimed a fatal blow at the magic of an echo
of the past.
The fulfillment of contractual obligations is a cherished con-
cern of the public.policy of any jurisdiction. The assertion of a
defense based upon public policy pleads an exception to that basic
policy. 48 The policy contract is the creature of the insurer: it
tmbodies not only the experience of the insurer itself but of every
Dther insurance company in existence. To the insurer, the language
may be esoteric; it may contain loopholes for technical defenses;
but to the person whom such language is addressed it can mean
only what clear language imports.4" Insurers today provide for
excepted risks in their policies. The assertion of other excepted
risks by implication based on technicalities has been the occasion
for legislation requiring the policy of insurance to contain the entire
agreement between the parties.50 To hold that there is an implied
exception of death at the hands of justice when the insurance con-
tract is silent thereon but contains other language contradictory to
such an exception is tantamount to the commission of a fraud on
those for whom the policy was procured and kept alive, by which
the insurer seeks a benefit from the wrongful act of the insured,
for by the express provisions of the contract was the insured in-
48 Corey v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 22. The West Virginia court
has declared in cases where the beneficiary has murdered the insured that
such felonious conduct does not relieve the insurer from its contractual
obligation if there is some one, other than the beneficiary, to take the pro-
ceeds. See Johnston v. Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865 (1919), wherein
the court stated that "the doctrine of public policy will not be carried by the
courts any further than is necessary to prevent resort to them for the pur-
pose of effecting a fraudulent intent."
49 Northwestern Mut. L. L Co. v. Johnson, supra n. 28.
to W. VA. Ruv. CODE (1931) c. 33, art. 5, § 9; TENN. ANN. CODE (1932)
§ 6179 (3); ComnP. TaX. STATS. (1928) art. 5050.
10
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duced to purchase the contract, the maturity of which was to be
effective at his death, limited only by the risks expressly excepted.
The true measure of the right to the proceeds should be the
language of the policy contract. The implied exception has been
vitiated by legislative fiat in Virginia."' For sometime at least,
courts may be prone to answer the rationale of the public policy
enunciated in the earlier cases, but it is submitted that the ap-
proach to the proper solution of the question will, by "casual ref-
erence" relegate the doctrine of the Boland case to "innocuous
desuetude."' 2
51 VA. CODE ANN. (1930) § 4228.
52 Note (1921) 30 YRAE L. J. 401, 402.
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